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Abstract: 
In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray claim that a high value for heritability of intelligence limits or 
constrains the extent to which intelligence can be increased by changing the environment. This article argues 
that the concept of heritability is based on unsupportable assumptions and that its numerical value places no 
constraint on the consequences of an improved environment. On the contrary, a very small change in 
environment, such as a dietary supplement, can lead to a major change in mental development, provided the 
change is appropriate to the specific kind of deficit that in the past has impaired development. The results of 
adoption studies and the intergenerational cohort effect also reveal that intelligence can be increased 
substantially without the need for heroic intervention. 
 
Article: 
The Bell Curve by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) addresses what they and many politicians perceive as a crisis 
in the United States brought about by wrong-headed government policies, policies they claim have resulted in 
"disaster," and they urge that government leaders should "try living with inequality" rather than striving to 
eradicate it. They believe that many people lack sufficient intelligence to be successful in American society, and 
they argue that an important part of their inability to compete successfully arises from inadequate genes. 
 
Even before it appeared in retail stores, the book was prominently publicized in the mass media as offering 
important insights about genetic causes of low intelligence and poverty. The October 16, 1994 issue of the New 
York Times Book Review featured The Bell Curve with a cover picture of a DNA double helix and the question 
"How much of us is in the genes?" Inside was a sympathetic review (Browne, 1994) emphasizing "ineradicable 
cognitive disability created by genetic bad luck" (p. 3). Although data in the book are almost exclusively 
concerned with the United States and the obsession with race is a peculiarly American trait, The Bell Curve was 
given major, albeit more critical, attention in national Canadian media (Bruning, 1994; Campbell, 1994). After a 
remarkably short delay, multiauthored, book-length discussions of The Bell Curve went on sale (Fraser, 1995; 
Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995). Herrnstein and Murray wrote a deliberately provocative book and in this respect 
they succeeded marvelously. Vast numbers of intellectuals in Canada and the US have set aside their work for a 
while and occupied their minds with genes and psychological testing. Although the book was not written to 
advance scientific knowledge and will not have much appeal for those in the biological sciences in particular, it 
has become necessary for many of us to examine it in some detail because of persistent questions about it from 
colleagues and journalists. 
 
As a specialist in behavioral and neural genetics, I focused on those chapters involving claims about heredity 
and inequality. Herrnstein specialized in the study of learning in rats and pigeons, whereas Murray is a political 
scientist. Herrnstein and Murray are obviously not geneticists: they are writing for an audience that knows little 
about genetics, and their readers will not gain a better understanding of genetic principles from reading their 
book. On the contrary, diligent readers who try to follow their reasoning will probably become confused and 
misled about the role of genes and the root causes of social problems. 
Herrnstein and Murray claim that statistical methods can reveal with reasonable accuracy the percentage of 
individual variation in intelligence that is caused by genetic differences among people, and they conclude that 
the "most unambiguous direct estimate" indicates this percentage is about 60-70%. They do not mention that 
this methodology presumes the effects of genes and environment occur separately during development and 
combine by simple arithmetical summation, or that this presumption has been rejected as biologically 
unrealistic by many geneticists (Gottlieb, 1992; Lewontin, 1974; McGuire & Hirsch, 1977; Wahlsten, 1990, 
1994). They claim that high "heritability" of IQ means that improving the environment of a poor child a modest 
amount will be ineffective because "such changes are limited in their potential consequences when heritability 
so constrains the limits of environmental effects" (p. 109). 
 
The Bell Curve is simply wrong on this point. A heritability estimate does not in any way constrain the effects 
of a moderately changed environment. Small treatments tend to have small effects unless the treatments directly 
and precisely ameliorate a specific difficulty that impairs development. If such a specific difficulty can be 
identified, a very small change in the environment can lead to a dramatic improvement. For example, during the 
first few decades of the 20th century, pellagra was quite common among the working poor of the southern US. 
The eugenicist Davenport claimed the slow learning and health problems of pellagrins resulted from an 
infection combined with bad genes, while the experimental proof by the physician Goldberger that it was a 
vitamin deficiency disease caused by low wages leading to a poor diet was ignored (Chase, 1977). Now we 
know that a small daily dose of the vitamin niacin can effectively prevent pellagra, just as vitamin C prevents 
scurvy and low phenylalanine milk prevents symptoms of the genetic disease phenylketonuria (PKU). Sweeping 
statements about the ineffectiveness of environmental change denote helplessness and pessimism occasioned by 
ignorance rather than any inherent resistance of intelligence to modification. Each of the 50,000 or more genes 
in the human chromosomes functions in a highly specific way as part of the biochemical system of a cell, and 
genetic knowledge can help to devise effective treatments only when a specific gene that impairs development 
is known. Bereft of genuine genetic knowledge, the kind of pseudogenetic heritability estimates espoused by 
Herrnstein and Murray serve as a weapon against the poor in the propaganda arsenal of reactionary politicians. 
 
The Bell Curve asserts confidently that "Changing cognitive ability through environmental intervention has 
proved to be extraordinarily difficult" (p. 314). This is false. Available data indicate that a modest, short term 
improvement such as the Head Start project in the US has correspondingly small effects on mental ability test 
scores, whereas a large and lasting improvement produced by adoption can exert quite a large effect. Well-
controlled studies done in France have found that transferring an infant from a family having low socio-
economic status (SES) to a home where parents have high SES improves childhood IQ scores by 12 to 16 points 
or about one standard deviation (Capron & Duyme, 1991; Schiff, Duyme, Dumaret, & Tomkiewicz, 1982; see 
Figure 1), which is considered a large effect size in psychological research (Cohen, 1988). Adoption can entail a 
major improvement in a child's environment, but the adoptive home is usually not off the scale of decent 
environments and therefore is not expected to yield a rich harvest of superior intellects. Achieving 
extraordinarily high levels of performance requires exceptional effort under the tutelage of expert instructors 
(Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Wagner & Oliver, in press). Outstanding achievement and brilliant 
creativity do not come "naturally" to anyone merely because of their genes. 
 
Changing mental ability test scores a modest amount is not so difficult. In fact, routine IQ testing reveals this 
commonly happens without deliberate intervention to enhance intelligence per se. The extent of this 
phenomenon tends to be obscured by the method of scoring the tests. The average IQ in a population should be 
about 100 and the standard deviation should be about 15, such that about 98% of people at the same age will 
score between 70 and 130 IQ points. One mechanism for scaling an IQ test is simple. The test is given in a 
particular year to a representative random sample of the population, and the numbers of items correct have 
mean and standard deviation of M and S, respectively. Then each raw score X is converted to a standard score Z 
that represents the number of standard deviations from the mean for the individual, using Z=(X—M) /S. The Z 
scores have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Finally, the Z scores are transformed to IQ scores with the 
formula IQ=100+Z(15). Thus IQ indicates relative performance on a test rather than absolute degree of 
intelligence. Over a period of several years it becomes necessary to restandardize the IQ test using more 
appropriate test items and a new sample of the population. This periodic restandardization of a test tends to keep 
the mean IQ close to 100, even if the underlying trait called intelligence is changing substantially in the 
population. 
 
An immense body of evidence reveals that raw, unstandardized intelligence has been gradually increasing for 
several decades-since World War II in many industrialized countries including Canada (Flynn, 1987). Two 
kinds of data show this trend clearly. Perhaps the most persuasive comes from the Netherlands, an ethnically 
homogenous country, where almost all 18-year-old males are given the Raven's Progressive Matrices test as 
part of military induction. The test itself has not been modified for several decades. As shown in Figure 2, there 
is a very large cohort effect amounting to 21 IQ points increase in the population over three decades. 
 
The other kind of evidence derives from the restandardization procedure when people given the new version of 
a test then take the old version so that validity can be assessed. For example, when the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children (WISC) was revised in 1972, the sample of children scored 7 points higher on the previous 
version of the WISC that had been standardized in 1947. Combining these kinds of data for several IQ tests, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in mean intelligence in the US is apparent over several decades (Figure 3). The 
cohort effect is gradual and almost linear since World War II, but in terms of a population-wide change in 
intelligence manifested in one generation of Americans, it is a large effect. It is especially thought-provoking 
that the size of the cohort effect is not much different than the widely publicized black-white IQ difference in 
the US. That is, more recently born children exceed the raw intelligence of their own parents at a comparable 
age by almost the same average amount as Americans of European ancestry exceed Americans of African 
ancestry, especially on more recent tests of mental ability. 
 
Herrnstein and Murray mention the cohort effect in their discussion of group differences, but they lightly 
dismiss it as a mere improvement in "test taking" skills or betterment of the living conditions of the 
disadvantaged. They muse that "one does not get the impression that the top of the IQ distribution is filled with 
more subtle, insightful, or powerful intellects than it was in our grandparents' day" (p. 308). Thus, faced with 
weighty evidence against their thesis, they are willing to dismiss the cohort effect with counter-arguments that 
negate some of their own fundamental claims. If the cohort effect represents improvement by only the bottom 
half of the "bell curve" rather than the entire population, then their earlier claim that increasing IQ is 
extraordinarily difficult loses credibility. After all, if the population mean increases by 15 points but the top part 
of the distribution does not increase, the lower scores must have increased by much more than 15 points. 
Herrnstein and Murray maintain assiduously in the first half of their book that IQ tests as we know them are 
very good measures of general intelligence. Yet the cohort effect causes them to revert to subjective 
impressions about their grandparents who must have been children when the IQ test was still embryonic in the 
mind of Alfred Binet. Actual experience in the US with the earliest administrations of IQ tests revealed that 
many men at the apex of American society were none too heavy under the helmet. The December 29, 1915 
issue of the Chicago Herald trumpeted to its public: "Hear how Binet-Simon method classed mayor and other 
officials as morons" (Chase, 1977, p. 241). As for outstanding intellects, without doubt they are products of 
their times and countries, but their achievements do not provide a valid measure of the intelligence of their 
lesser countrymen, who all too often failed to recognize genius in their midst, partly because of the prevailing 
political and social definition of genius (Weisberg, 1986). Formal IQ tests were intended to supplant subjective 
impression and common prejudice with carefully constructed instruments administered in a controlled 
conditions. For Herrnstein and Murray to tiptoe around the cohort effect by suggesting that IQ tests do not 
really measure genuine intelligence but something more superficial and transitory is a negation of a 
fundamental part of the thesis of The Bell Curve. 
 
The cohort effect poses an even greater challenge to the raison d'être of The Bell Curve. Herrnstein and Murray 
raise the alarm about several worrisome social trends in the US and argue that inadequate intelligence is the root 
cause of most social problems. They present striking graphs of social statistics over several decades that reveal a 
dramatic deterioration in American society, especially from 1960 to 1990. Over this period, we are told that the 
marriage rate has declined while the divorce rate has increased from 7% to 20% and "illegitimate" births have 
increased from 5% to 30%, welfare caseloads have risen from 1.5% to 7%, and the rate of violent crimes is now 
five times higher than three decades ago. Nevertheless, the raw intelligence of American youth has apparently 
increased a substantial amount over this same interval. A national decline in intelligence could not possibly be 
the basis for these negative social trends. 
 
The primary evidence Herrnstein and Murray offer for the important influence of individual intelligence in 
American society is a series of positive correlations between IQ and variables such as success in school, work, 
and social life. Correlations are notoriously poor guides to the direction of causal influences even when multiple 
regression methods are used, and this kind of information cannot distinguish between socioeconomic causes of 
low or high intelligence and consequences that flow from differences in intelligence at any one time. 
Comparisons of groups of people living in changed environments, on the other hand, can reveal the direction of 
causation. Adoption from a low SES home into a high SES home is clearly a change in environment that 
precedes and causes the change in childhood IQ, presuming the theorist will admit that even the brightest 
infants lack the power to choose their parents. Likewise, the cohort effect implicates nationwide environmental 
change as the cause of enhanced childhood intelligence. This enhanced intelligence may then consolidate and 
build on past achievements as the youth mature and become productive, influential members of society. 
 
In my opinion, The Bell Curve from beginning to end suffers from a lack of intellectual rigor and a rather 
cavalier use of data mustered from here and there to bolster an obvious political agenda. The authors are 
worried about the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the US and the apparent disintegration of 
American society, and they offer some suggestions for policies that make sense from the perspective of the 
psychology of animal learning, Herrnstein's specialty. When they invoke genetic explanations for class and 
racial differences in educational and occupational achievement, however, they enter a realm where their 
incompetence is painfully evident (Kamin, 1995). Herrnstein, Murray, and their publicists still do not 
understand that genetic phenomena cannot be the root causes of short-term social trends. These socioeconomic 
trends are rooted in the political and economic system that prevails in the US. Moral decay does not arise from a 
sudden, inexplicable epidemic of genetic mutations. The obsession of so many social scientists and journalists 
with genetic victim blaming serves to divert attention from the real causes and cures of social ills. The Bell 
Curve itself and the attention lavished on it are symptoms of social malaise in the US. 
 
As a final example of this malaise manifest in academic circles, consider the attempt by Herrnstein and Murray 
to deny the accusations of fraud against British psychologist Cyril Burt, who is widely recognized as the author 
of fictitious data and articles purporting to show high heritability of IQ (Hearnshaw, 1979). In a box on page 12, 
Herrnstein and Murray cite books by Joynson and Fletcher claiming to show that accusations against Burt are 
groundless. What Herrnstein and Murray fail to mention is an authoritative, peer reviewed critique by Samelson 
(1992) of these books that finds the accusations against Burt well substantiated and the work of his defenders 
shoddy and one-sided. Samelson concludes: 
 
What does this whole affair tell us about so-called science and scientists, insiders and outsiders, power 
structures and establishment climates in a profession, about "experts" whose beliefs flipflop from one 
side to the other, about presumably responsible editors, and finally about "quality control"? Beyond 
some pious words about them, we do not appear to have made much progress on these issues. (p. 231) 
 
In this respect The Bell Curve is a step backward rather than a benchmark of progress in the nature-nurture 
debate. 
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